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AN APPROACH TO UNCONSCIONABILrrY IN
THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURTS
In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Company,' indicates that at least one
federal district will use bankruptcy's broad equity powers to enable its
referees to nullify a security agreement when " 'the sum total of its provisions
drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist.' "'
The bankrupt and Fidelity America Financial Corporation entered into
an agreement whereby the latter would finance the former against an as-
signment of accounts receivable. The agreement stipulated that the assignor
would pay about 16% interest (or a minimum of $500 a month) on the
loans,' and that Fidelity would lend 75% of the face amount of the ac-
counts that it might choose. Elkins-Dell was allowed to borrow only from
Fidelity, who could have the former's mail sent directly to it for disposition
as it wished. The borrower agreed not to file a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy without the written consent of Fidelity. Substantial amounts were
loaned and collections were made against the advances. When the invol-
untary petition was filed against Elldns-Dell, about $14,000 was still owing;
1. 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
2. Id. at 867, quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir.
1948). In the companion case, In re Dorset Steel Equip. Co., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 864
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (hereinafter cited as Dorset Steel), the court reached a similar result
on only slightly different facts.
3. In Dorset Steel, the security agreements were essentially the same, except the in-
terest rate was about 18% and the minimum interest per month was $250. At the date of
adjudication there was still an unpaid balance due Fidelity of over $11,000, and Fi-
delity filed as a secured creditor for this amount. The referee disallowed the security,
but allowed Fidelity to file as an unsecured creditor, and ordered it to refund to the
trustee all interest in excess of 6% already collected. The referee further declared that
the unconscionability provisions of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1962) were
not limited to sales contracts (also suggested in 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1164 (Supp.
1962)) and were directly applicable here to nullify the security agreement. The code
section states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.
Compare these "criteria" with the suggestions of the court in the principal case for de-
termining unconscionability. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 873-74,
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
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however, continued collections created a credit balance of $2,000 within
a month. By the date of adjudication, the credit balance was as high as
$10,678. Between the filing and the adjudication, the trustee demanded
an accounting; it was rendered and exceptions were taken. Drawing on
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,' the referee declared the security agreement
unconscionable,5 and ordered Fidelity to turn over to the estate the money
collected on the accounts after the petition was filed,' the advance on the
minimum interest paid by the bankrupt, and all interest in excess of 6%
since the first loan was made.7
In support of the referee's basic premise that the inherent equity pow-
ers of a bankruptcy court entitle it to declare a security agreement un-
conscionable, the Elkins-Dell court indicated that bankruptcy powers extend
not only to the issuance of orders and the granting of the relief sought, but
also to an examination of the circumstances surrounding any claim to see
that injustice or unfairness is not done in administering the estate.' Em-
phasizing that the federal courts of bankruptcy are "essentially courts of
equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity,"' the district
court remanded solely because of the criteria used by the referee for
the determination of unconscionability.
Noting a possible conflict with an earlier Supreme Court decision, the
district court distinguished Manufacturer's Finance Co. v. McKey 0i whose
salient facts varied little from the case at bar. In McKey, the lower court
affirmed a referee's order adjusting the effective interest rate on the as-
signment of the accounts receivable of the bankrupt to the creditor finance
company. When a receiver was appointed for the then solvent debtor, the
creditor attempted to force the receiver to comply with the terms of the
4. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
5. 39 RnF. J. 115 (1965).
6. If the security agreement is void ab initio for unconscionability, it is curious that
the referee did not order Fidelity to turn over payments within four months of bankruptcy,
which payments would have constituted a preference. Presumably, Fidelity was aware
of the borrower's financial straits, and the payments were for an antecedent debt (prior
loans), thereby satisfying the requirements of a preference. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11
U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
7. "The interest rate would have been usurious, except for the Pennsylvania statute
[PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, § 1313 (1967)] which precludes a corporation from raising
the defense of usury." In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 866 (E.D. Pa.
1966).
8. Id. at 867-68, citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939); accord,
Central States Corp. v. Luther, 215 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951
(1955).
9. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240, (1934).
10. 294 U.S. 442 (1935).
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contract insofar as they affected the accounts already assigned. The debt
outstanding at the time of receivership had been paid, but the "service
charge" or interest had not, and the receiver, as well as the circuit court,"1
refused to allow the creditor's claim in excess of the rate of 7%, or only
about one-third the amount claimed. The Supreme Court reversed, noting
that the parties dealt at arm's length, that there was no fraud in the con-
tract, and that the creditor arrived in a federal court of equity asserting
what would otherwise have been only a legal right.'2
The mere fact that a party is obliged to go into a federal court of
equity to enforce an essentially legal right arising upon a contract
valid and unassailable under controlling state law does not authorize
that court to modify or ignore the terms of the legal obligation upon
the claim, or because the court thinks that these terms are harsh or
oppressive or unreasonable. A party may stand upon the terms of a
valid contract in a court of equity as he may in a court of law. "If
he asks no favors, he need grant none."13
Interestingly, the McKey court continued:
"But if he calls upon a court of chancery to put forth its extraordinary
powers and grant him purely equitable relief, he may with propriety
be required to submit to the operation of a rule which always applies
in such cases, and do equity in order to get equity."' 4
Thus, legal rights stand as strong in chancery as in a court of law, no mat-
ter what the appeal to the conscience of the chancellor.' Unless the plain-
tiff enters a court of equity seeking equitable relief,' 6 a court of equity is
powerless to change the terms of a contract, in the absence of fraud, ac-
cident or mistake.'
The pronouncements in McKey seem dispositive of the issues in Elkins-
Dell, but the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was far from satisfied, noting
11. Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 72 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1934), rev'd, 294
U.S. 442 (1935).
12. Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 448 (1935).
13. Id. at 448-49.
14. Id., quoting Fosdick v. SchalI, 99 U.S. 235, 253 (1898).
15. Colonial Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 243 Pa. 268, 276, 90 At 189, 191
(1914).
16. As was the situation in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.
1948).
17. Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 189 (1893). But see Left, Unconsciona-
bility and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 534 (1967)
wherein the author suggests that "there is nothing in an 'equitable' doctrine as such
that particularly makes it unfitted for importation into an action which would histor-
ically have been an action 'at law."'
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significant dissimilarities between the cases. In contrast to the lender's sit-
uation in McKey, Fidelity, as creditor in Elkins-Dell, "relies on its security"
and is "'asking a favor' of the bankruptcy court.""8 Apparently, this refers
to the fact that Fidelity continued to collect on the security after the pe-
tition was filed, "a course which requires the approval of the bankruptcy
court."' 9 The court does not tell us how the collections were made prior to
bankruptcy, but it is nearly certain that payments by customers of the bank-
rupt were made directly to Fidelity all along. If this is so, it is difficult to
see how the continuation of this practice turns the proceeding into one of
equity. The manner of collection during the bankruptcy proceedings was
undoubtedly a matter of convenience, of which the referee was fully aware.
His rubber-stamp approval of this technique hardly seems reason to deny
Fidelity the relief requested, notwithstanding any technical distinctions be-
tween "equity" and "law" drawn by either the Elkins-Dell or the McKey
courts." However, the Elkins-Dell court insisted that as to both debtors,
Fidelity "asked for the affirmative aid of the bankruptcy court to secure
its preferred position in the bankruptcy. That aid having been invoked,
equitable scrutiny attaches.""1 The alleged distinction between this situa-
tion and McKey is that in the principle case, the creditor was seeking
equitable relief whereas in the McKey case, the creditor was "obliged to
submit the determination of his strictly legal rights to a chancery court
because it has plenary control of the remedy.' 2 The distinction is dubious,
because regardless of the forum, both creditors were merely attempting to
be reimbursed for loans made under a security agreement.
The further distinction is made by the court in Elkins-Dell that state law
is no longer controlling.23 The McKey court had relied heavily on the en-
forceability of the agreement to pay usurious interest rates under the con-
trolling state law. Similar rules apply under the laws of Pennsylvania, the
state in which Fidelity made its loan agreements. But, "the validity of the
claim under state law would be no bar to disallowing it in bankruptcy be-
cause the bankruptcy court must exercise '[the] authority granted by Con-
gress to determine how and what claims shall be allowed under equitable
18. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Go., 253 F. Supp. 864, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
19. Id.
20. See quote in note 17, supra.
21. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1966). In Dorset
Steel, the court reasoned similarly when Fidelity filed a secured claim under its security
agreement.
22. Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935).
23. See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1945).
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principles.' "" Although appealing at first glance, this argument of the
Elkins-Dell court is incomplete, for it suggests no compelling federal law
to the contrary which insists that the court nullify the security agreement.
If, indeed, the contract is unconscionable, the issue is still whether equitable
principles (be they federal or state) apply, or do legal principles apply?
The court's reasoning insufficiently establishes that a federal bankruptcy
court need impose equitable doctrines in this situation.
Finally, the Elkins-Dell court points out that Fidelity could seek relief
only in the bankruptcy court, whereas Campbell Soup Co. could have
sought damages in a court of law.2" The McKey decision indicates that the
exclusiveness of the remedy in the equity court should not jeopardize plain-
tiff's rights.2" While obliged to submit the determination of his strictly
legal rights to a chancellor only because the latter has plenary control
of the remedy, a plaintiff should not be penalized, even though an other-
wise valid contract which he is asserting drives a hard bargain for the other
party." In McKey, the court states that if a plaintiff has no other forum
in which to press his claim but an equity court, then that court should not
conjure up equitable maxims and refuse to enforce that claim.2 ' But the
Elkins-Dell court implies that Fidelity should not be able to avail itself of
this reasoning. There was some indication that the harshness of Fidelity's
bargain may have precipitated the bankruptcies, and that if the bankruptcy
court is the only forum in which Fidelity could press its claim, this is a
situation of its own making. But this distinction from McKey also leaves
much to be desired, for as this court admits, it rests on implications not
sufficiently supported by the record. 9 The distinctions between this case
and McKey drawn by the Elkins-Dell court are tenuous and unconvincing,
and it seems that this court is subtlely sidestepping the mandates of the
decision in McKey.
Although the distinctions drawn between the McKey case and Elkins-
24. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (citation
omitted).
25. Id. at 870.
26. Whether or not plaintiff's rights will in fact be jeopardized is a matter of con-
jecture. See Leff, supra note 17, at 541 n.237.
27. Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 451 (1935).
28. C.f., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948).
29. A finding that Fidelity itself bargained away its choice of remedies by mak-
ing the bankruptcy more certain-that it is, loosely speaking, estopped from
complaining of the scrutiny which equity gives its claims-would have to
be predicated on more than speculation about the effect the contracts had
on the bankrupt's businesses. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864,
870 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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Dell are somewhat oblique, the district court may have been justified in
attempting to side-step the mandate laid down in the ancient Supreme Court
decision, for there exists a continuing line of decisions applying equitable
doctrines. That bankruptcy courts attempt to "do equity" is not a novel
idea.30 Section 2 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act invests these courts with "juris-
diction ...in equity."31 Within the confines of the Act itself, and under
special rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court, the proceedings
are to be administered in accord with the general principles of equity.82
New remedies may be contrived where those at law are inadequate, 3 but
the equitable powers of the court are to be exercised within the limits of
the Act34 and subject to its dictates.3 s The court has summary jurisdiction
to determine all claims against the property of the bankrupt estate, 0 but
this jurisdiction does not extend to conducting plenary suits to settle claims
having no proper relation to the business with which the court is en-
trusted." On the other hand, bankruptcy and related courts have extended
relief such as making distributions to junior lien-holders,8 striking down
vague and ambiguous subordination provisions of debentures and putting
the holders thereof into the class of general creditors along with note hold-
ers who had not relied on the subordination provisions,"9 granting an in-
junction against a railroad for the sale of pledged collateral,40 returning
30. See Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942); SEC v. United
States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939). For a breakdown of equity powers exercised by the court, see 1 W. COLLIER,
BANRUPTCY § 2.09 n.1 (14th ed. 1966).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1964).
32. In re Lustron Corp., 184 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 946 (1950).
33. See Tyler v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 128 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1942); Scotts-
ville Nat'l Bank v. Gilmer, 37 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1930); In re Franklin Brewing Co.,
254 Fed. 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1918). And a bankruptcy court may adopt remedies that a
local state court would apply. In re Gunning, 124 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1941).
34. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
35. Id. at 455. See also, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). Some courts have
thought the Pepper case sanctions almost any use of equitable power in a bankruptcy
court. In re Bender Body Co., 47 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 139 F.2d 128 (6th
Cir. 1942); In re Credit Service, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1942). The suit itself
is not a "suit in equity" either by statutory or common-sense definition of that term.
Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. American Fuel & Power Co., 322 U.S. 379 (1944).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 46a (1964).
37. Smith v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 84 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1936); c.f., Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323 (1966). However, if the administration of the estate cannot properly
proceed without the settlement of the controversy, the bankruptcy court will assume
jurisdiction, In re Burton Coal Co., 126 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1942), or will stay pro-
ceedings until the matter is decided by the appropriate court.
38. In re Evergreen Memorial Park Ass'n, 308 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1962).
39. In re Joe Newcomer Fin. Co., 226 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1964).
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any surplus to the bankrupt after the creditors are paid in full,4' appointing
special masters (before the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure)," declaring a deed to be a mortgage,43 reopening an order of dis-
missal," requiring refunds of unauthorized payments as a condition to the
allowance of claims,4" imposing equitable conditions upon the granting
of a reclamation petition," applying the equitable doctrine of laches, 7
and reforming a chattel mortgage on fixtures and merchandise to
eliminate the provisions covering merchandise if the court is convinced
that they were inserted through mutual mistake of fact.48 The full list of
equity relief granted by the bankruptcy court is long, the situations varied,
'and the relief given extensive. The courts have simply adapted the tra-
ditions of equity to meet the circumstances at hand. And if unconscionability
is a worthwhile legal doctrine, there is little reason for stopping short of it
in bankruptcy, if it is applied cautiously and with due regard for the rights
of the creditor who is asserting his claim, be it legal or equitable, under an
allegedly unconscionable agreement. The distinction in McKey between
seeking legal and equitable relief seem spurious in terms of modem judicial
reasoning, and perhaps that case should be overruled, so that lower courts
like the Elkins-Dell court would not have to draw doubtful distinctions
between its decisions and that of McKey. Perhaps the exceptions to the
limitations on the power of the equity courts to change a contract should
now include unconscionability. As Corbin suggests:
It is difficult to believe, however, that the judges of today, practically
all of them "chancellors" as well as "judges," can fail to be influenced
by equitable doctrines in the granting of any of the remedies that are
available. There is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress,
misrepresentation, and undue influence, not to mention differences in
bargaining power, to enable the courts to avoid enforcement of a bar-
gain that is shown to be unconscionable ... "
40. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Is. & Pac. Ry. Co.,
294 U.S. 648 (1935) (a railroad reorganization case).
41. In re Lennox, 2 F.2d 92, 93 (W.D. Pa. 1924).
42. Berl v. Crutcher, 60 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 670 (1933).
43. In re Euclid Doan Co., 104 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1939).
44. Kroell v. New York Ambassador, Inc., 108 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1939).
45. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
46. In re Detroit Macaroni Co., 46 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
47. Continental Can Co., Inc. v. Graham, 220 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1955).
48. In re Traymore Shoe Shops, Inc., 300 Fed. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (dictum);
In re Brenner, 190 Fed. 209 (D. Pa. 1911).
49. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1950).
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If bankruptcy courts are indeed courts of equity, whose intention is to pro-
tect all of the creditors of the debtor, as well as the debtor himself, there
would seem to be no reason not to extend the relief as Corbin proposes.
Moreover, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the result reached
in the principal case was both sensible and desirable. The contract therein
seemed one-sided and there was some inference that it was the base of the
troubles that drove Elkins-Dell under." If a factor has forced an unreason-
able contract upon a relatively defenseless company in a strictly sellers'
market, then for the sake of the other creditors of a bankrupt, there ought
to be (at least) a modification of the contract in order to make it more
equitable to all concerned.51 Although the bankruptcy court would not be
allowed to charge a penalty against the factor for driving so hard a bar-
gain,5" it still must enforce the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act by securing
an equitable distribution of an insolvent debtor's estate." The differences
between "law' and "equity" are age-old. However, the necessity of retain-
ing the distinction in such a situation in a court whose essential duty is to
protect a large number of creditors as well as the debtor may be dubious. At
any rate, perhaps the application of the doctrine of unconscionability should
no longer depend on the kind of relief initially sought by the claimant, as
suggested by the McKey court, but rather on the appropriateness of the
situation and the proposed remedy.
Finally, once it is accepted that unconscionability is applicable when
appropriate in bankruptcy proceedings, the exercise of caution is essential
to maintain the balance of fairness sought in a court of equity."' Indicative
of such caution are the elaborate instructions" issued by the court on re-
50. Note 29, supra.
51. As one author points out, the harshness in Campbell Soup which would arise
from enforcing the contract was not directed at the unfairness complained of and found
to exist. Leff, supra note 17, at 538. In the case of Elkins-Dell, however, the harshness
of enforcing the bargain directly related to the unfairness complained of.
52. In re Black Ranches, Inc., 362 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1966); In re Tastycast, Inc., 126
F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1942).
53, In re Laskin, 316 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir. 1963).
54. If the security agreements between Fidelity and the bankrupts were indeed un-
conscionable, the factor will be allowed to prove its claims as an unsecured creditor.
In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1966); see 3 W. COLLIER,
BAxKRUPTCY § 57.20[4] (14th ed. 1966).
55. The criteria for determining the conscionability of an agreement are set down by
the court as follows: (a) financial positions of the bankrupts when the contracts were
made; (b) extent to which agreements like this are customary among lenders like Fi-
delity; (c) extent to which Fidelity's contracts vary with and reflect anticipated risks;
(d) availability of other credit to the bankrupts, both at the time and after they en-
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mand to the referee. The care exercised by the district court is explicable
in light of its unique position leaving it in conflict with an antiquated Su-
preme Court decision.
tered into the agreements; (e) ability to secure other funds; (f) amount of facilitation
of commerce by making new funds available; (g) effect of holding these contracts en-
forceable on such future agreements. A further discussion of the Elkins-Dell criteria is
contained in 40 S. CAL. L. Rav. 165 (1967).
The UCO also indicates some factors to help in the determination of conscionability.
Note 3, supra. At least one source feels that these criteria, if they can be called such,
are inadequate to inform the court of precisely what the framers of the Code intended
when they included section 2-302. Leff, supra note 17. Perhaps "unconscionability" is
comparable to Justice Stewart's "definition" of obscenity, when he said:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never suc-
ceed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, . Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion).
Unconscionability is no less elusive a doctrine to define and to spot, and one wonders
about the type of testimony to be given on remand before the referees in Elkins-Dell and
Dorset Steel. C.I., Leff, supra note 17, at 544-45. Whether or not this problem will
seriously interfere with the application of the doctrine in bankruptcy cases, or for that
matter, in any situation where unconscionability need be applied, is a matter yet to be
determined.
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